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This paper proposes a theoretical model to account for the most re-
levant micro- and macroeconomic empirical facts in the tax evasion li-
terature. To do so, we integrate tax morale into a dynamic overlapping
generations model of capital income tax evasion. Tax morale is mode-
led as a social norm for tax compliance. It is shown that accounting for
such nonpecuniary costs of evasion may not only explain (i) why some
taxpayers never evade even if the gamble is profitable, and (ii) how a
higher tax rate can increase evasion, but also that (iii) the share of
evaded taxes over GDP decreases with the stage of economic develop-
ment and (iv) that tax morale is positively correlated with the level of
GDP per capita as suggested by recent empirical evidence. Finally, a
higher tax rate increases aggregate evasion as well as the number of
evaders in the economy when taxpayers decisions are interdependent.
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1 Introduction
Tax evasion is one of the main problems faced by fiscal authorities. For
example, Slemrod (2007) estimates that the U.S. income tax gap in 2001
amounts to a total of $345 billion–more than 15% of the estimated actual
(paid plus unpaid) tax liability. However, tax evasion is not a particular
phenomenon in developed countries.1 As estimated by Cobham (2005), for
instance, the overall level of tax revenue lost due to tax evasion in developing
countries is equal to $285 billion per year. Thus, explaining the patterns of
tax evasion and identifying tools to reduce it is an important concern in all
economies.
The theoretical analysis of tax evasion starts with the seminal papers
by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) which model tax eva-
sion as a static portfolio selection issue.2 Subsequent empirical and experi-
mental findings, however, have revealed important inconsistences between
theory and evidence3. Specifically, the literature has identified four main
puzzles: first, the finding that tax evasion increases with the tax rate (Clot-
felter, 1983, Poterba, 1987, Joulfaian and Rider, 1996) while theory predicts
the opposite. Second, the finding of low levels of tax evasion in many coun-
tries compared to the high level predicted by theory given the low levels
of deterrence (see Alm (1999) and Torgler (2002) for a review). Third, the
finding that some taxpayers never evade, even if evasion is the profitable
option (Baldry, 1986, Alm, 1999). Fourth, the finding that the level of tax
evasion and taxpayers’ attitudes towards evasion are related to the behavior
of other taxpayers (Gaechter, 2006). This paper sets up a dynamic model of
tax evasion in order to reconcile theory with empirical evidence.
While many studies have extended the basic portfolio selection model
to explain these puzzles in a similar static framework4, only a few recent
papers analyze tax evasion in a dynamic context (Lin and Yang, 2001, Chen,
2003, Dzhumashev and Gahramanov, 2011, Levaggi and Menoncin, 2012).
However, as the main focus of these papers is on how tax evasion affects the
relationship between income taxation and economic growth in the long-run,
1See Fuest and Riedel (2009) for a survey of tax evasion in developing countries.
2Alm (1999), Andreoni et al. (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Slemrod (2007)
are recent surveys reviewing the main literature on the nature and determinants of tax
evasion.
3See Alm et al. (1992) and Frey and Feld (2002) among others.
4Most of the papers has focused on explaining the positive relationship between tax rate
and evasion. Among these papers, Cowell and Gordon (1988) poses a framework where tax-
payers consider the provision of public goods; Landskroner et al. (1990) introduces the pos-
sibility of investing in financial assets; Lee (2001) considers the possibility of self-insurance
against possible penalties and Bayer (2006) endogenizes the probability of audit.
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none of these papers studies the effects of tax evasion behavior in the short-
run and in particular throughout the transition towards the steady state. To
close this gap in the literature is the aim of the present paper.
We set up a general equilibrium model of capital income tax evasion.
More precisely, we integrate the Allingham-Sandmo framework into a dy-
namic two period overlapping-generations setting with production.5 Our
model departs from a simple version with amoral agents and subsequently,
in order to address the inconsistencies between theory and evidence, consi-
ders a more sophisticated version with tax morale and heterogeneous agents.
Tax morale can be defined as an internalized social norm for tax compliance
which expands the cost incurred by evaders to include not only the fines
payable upon detection, but also certain non-pecuniary considerations (for
an overview, see Torgler (2002) and Dell’Anno (2009)). As in Yitzhaki (1974),
taxpayers are audited with a positive probability and, if caught, have to
pay a penalty on the amount of evaded taxes.6 Aggregate savings of utility
maximizing agents determine the dynamics of the economy. Given a neo-
classical technology, per capita capital increases throughout the transition
towards the steady state, which in turn decreases the rate of return and
therefore the incentives to evade taxes. In such a framework, the amount of
undeclared taxes may increase both in the transition and in the steady state
when the tax rate rises and individuals care about morality. More specifi-
cally, an increase in the tax rate generates two competing effects: a negative
income effect that disincentives to evade and a net increase in the benefit
of being dishonest which encourages taxpayers to evade. Thus, for a reason-
able set of parameters the second effect prevails. Moreover, it is shown that
increases in the strength of the norm to honestly pay what is owed as well
as in the audit probability produce low levels of tax evasion in the long-run
and throughout the transition towards the new steady state.
The main contribution of this paper is to present a simple dynamic model
of tax evasion which accounts simultaneously for well known micro empiri-
cal findings as well as for the latest macro-dynamic observations. Specifi-
cally, our model allows us to derive several new results in the literature on
tax evasion which are consistent with existing empirical evidence.
First, our model predicts that the share of tax evasion is declining dur-
ing the transition towards the steady state level. In this respect, Crane
and Nourzad (1986) who study the evolution of aggregate tax evasion in
5See e.g. Boadway and Keen (1998) for a related approach. They study the role of capital
income tax evasion in alleviating welfare losses due to time inconsistent taxation within an
open economy model.
6For reasons of simplicity we assume that tax revenue is wasted. Alternatively, this can
be interpreted as financing a public consumption good which increases individual utility.
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the United States over the period 1947-81, show that despite tax evasion
increases in absolute terms, it has fallen in relative terms when income
has risen. This result is further supported by evidence in Schneider et al.
(2011). According to their findings, the relative size of the shadow economy7
for 162 countries over the period 1999 to 2007 has decreased whereas the un-
weighted average of GDP per capita for the same set of countries and over
the same time horizon has increased.8
Second, neoclassical growth theory which describes the dynamics of the
economies in the model, predicts that countries with low levels of per capita
GDP (per capita capital) display high levels of tax evasion. By contrast, high-
income countries (high levels of per capita capital) show low levels of tax
evasion, for the same size of tax rates and similar technologies and prefer-
ences. Gordon and Li (2005), for example, document sharp differences in
the ability to generate tax revenue among developed and developing coun-
tries: though statutory tax rates are fairly similar across countries, effective
tax rates differ widely given the lower fraction of GDP collected by these
taxes among poorer countries. For instance, the maximum personal income
tax rate in developed countries is on average 1.23 times higher than in devel-
oped countries, whereas income tax revenue over GDP is 2.47 times larger in
developed countries. A similar pattern is also demonstrated by Easterly and
Rebelo (1993a) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993b). According to their findings,
income tax evasion is an important phenomenon, in particular for develop-
ing countries9. Consistent with these observations, our model predicts that
the size of tax evasion decreases insofar countries accumulate capital and
reach higher levels of income.
Finally, we find a positive correlation between per capita GDP and tax
morale. More precisely, our model predicts that countries with high levels of
7Tax evasion can be considered to be an integral part of the shadow economy. Though it
is difficult to have reliable information about the exact size of tax evasion, since it is an ille-
gal activity and individuals have strong incentives to conceal their cheating, and though the
shadow economy is clearly not synonymous with tax evasion, many researchers (Schneider
(2005) and Alm and Embaye (2011) among others) frequently use shadow economy esti-
mates as an indicator for the size of tax evasion. See Alm (2012) for a detailed discussion
about the measuring of tax evasion.
8Specifically, this unweighted average of GDP per capita rose from 5200 US$ to 8400
US$ over the whole period, while the unweighted average size of the shadow economies
of all of these 162 countries decreased from 34.0% of official GDP in 1999 to 31.2% of
official GDP in 2007. Data on GDP per capita are taken from the World Bank, see
http://data.worldbank.org/.
9Also, the cross sectional findings about the relative size of the informal economy by
Friedman et al. (2000) indicate that informality is (on average) a more severe problem in
countries with low GDP per capita, especially in Latin American countries.
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per capita income display low levels of evasion and a low share of evaders in
the economy. A low share of evaders, in turn, implies larger moral costs of
evading since the majority of population pays what they owe and this is per-
ceived as the right behavior. Thus, the more other taxpayers are perceived
to be honest, the more willing individuals are to pay their own taxes and re-
duce evasion. In this respect, Weck (1983) and Torgler (2003) document the
existence of a positive relationship between tax evasion and tax morale for
a wide sample of countries. Their findings support the hypothesis that the
behavior of a taxpayer is influenced strongly by his perception of the behav-
ior of other taxpayers. Moreover, Frey and Torgler (2007) and Torgler and
Schneider (2007) find that countries which display higher rates of tax eva-
sion are characterized by low quality institutions or weak direct democratic
rights10, and Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Bethencourt (2013) among others,
show that these countries are typically developing countries with low levels
of per capita income. Thus, the empirical facts support the finding that high
income countries exhibit high quality institutions, high levels of tax morale
and so, low levels of evasion.
Our work relates to the literature analyzing the effects of morality, cus-
toms and stigma on tax evasion behavior, see Gordon (1989), Myles and Nay-
lor (1996), Kim (2003) and Traxler (2010). While these papers demonstrate
how such non-pecuniary considerations may account for some of the tax eva-
sion puzzles within a static framework11, our contribution relative to these
studies lies in modeling the dynamics of per capita capital and linking the
size of tax evasion to the state of economic development.
Our work also relates to papers studying dynamic models of tax evasion,
see e.g. Lin and Yang (2001), Chen (2003), Dzhumashev and Gahramanov
(2011) and Levaggi and Menoncin (2012). Relative to these papers, however,
we do not focus on the tax evasion-growth nexus, but rather on the dynamics
of tax evasion throughout the transition towards the steady state. This in
turn allows us to document not only cross country variations in levels of tax
evasion but also to account for the development of these levels over time.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model without morality. Section 3 extends the basic framework to account
for nonpecuniary costs of evasion and Section 4 concludes. Some proofs and
technical considerations are included in the appendix.
10These results are further supported by evidence in Friedman et al. (2000) suggesting
that weak economic institutions imply a large unofficial economy.
11Note that we refer to these models as static insofar as they do not allow for income
dynamics. However, as in the present paper, the share of evaders may well change over
time.
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2 The Basic Model
The basic framework is a two period overlapping-generations model in the
tradition of Diamond (1965). The size of each generation is assumed to be
constant and normalized to one. Non-altruistic individuals are endowed
with one unit of labor time when young, and are retired during old age. Mar-
kets are competitive.
The government collects a proportional tax on capital income which may,
however, be evaded by individuals. The reason we focus on capital income
tax evasion is twofold. First, the probability of detection is much lower than
for other income sources and therefore the opportunities for hiding true in-
come from the tax collector are substantially higher than for example in the
case of labor (Poterba, 1987, Sandmo, 2012). Second, capital income tax eva-
sion is indeed a serious problem in many countries (see e.g., Slemrod (2007)
for the US). Also, as pointed out by Sandmo (2012), ‘in the theoretical lite-
rature, the evasion of taxes on labor income has received considerably more
attention than the evasion of taxes on capital. It is not obvious why this
should be so; as already noted, it is difficult to argue that capital income
evasion is of less empirical importance.’
2.1 Firms
On the production side of the model, perfect competition between a large
number of identical firms is assumed. A representative firm in period t pro-
duces a homogenous output good according to a Cobb–Douglas production
function with capital K t and homogeneous labour L t as inputs:
Yt = AKαt L1−αt , (1)
where 1>α> 0 is the share parameter of capital.
Each firm maximizes profits under perfect competition, implying that, in
equilibrium, production factors are paid their marginal products:
wt = (1−α)AKαt L−αt = (1−α)Akαt (2)
and
r t =αAKα−1t L1−αt =αAkα−1t (3)
where kt =K t/L t is the capital intensity.
2.2 Consumers
Each generation consists of agents whose life has two periods of equal lengths:
the young adult age during which each agent inelastically supplies one unit
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of labor time to work and raises one offspring, and the old age spent in re-
tirement. Since each young adult produces one offspring, the population
remains constant in every generation and is normalized to one. When adult,
working individuals receive the wage wt. Income is spent on consumption ct
and savings st:
wt = ct+ st. (4)
When old, each individual consumes the return to his savings and may evade
a fraction e t+1 ∈ [0,1] of this return. The declared income gets taxed with a
proportional income tax at rate τ. With a fixed probability p the evasion gets
detected. In this case, the tax evader has to pay the full taxes and a penalty
γ which is proportional to the taxes evaded Yitzhaki (1974). With probability
1− p the evasion remains undetected and the evader only pays taxes on the
declared income. The corresponding levels of second period consumption for
state u - escaping undetected - or state d - getting detected - are given by
dut+1 =Rut+1st (5)
ddt+1 =Rdt+1st (6)
where Rut+1 = 1−δ+r t+1(1−τ+τe t+1), Rdt+1 = 1−δ+r t+1(1−τ−γτe t+1) and δ ∈
[0,1] denotes the depreciation rate of capital. The life-cycle utility function
of an individual born in t is
E[U(ct,dut+1,d
d
t+1)]= u(ct)+ (1− p)βu(dut+1)+ pβu(ddt+1) (7)
where β > 0 is a discount factor. For reasons of tractability we will assume
that the expected utility representation u is logarithmic, i.e., u(x) = ln(x).
Each individual maximizes the utility (7), subject to the constraints (4), (5)
and (6), by choosing ct, st, e t+1, dut+1 and d
d
t+1. With logarithmic preferences,
it is straight forward to show that
st = β1+βwt. (8)
As a result, the decision on e t+1 does not depend on st. The first and second
order conditions with respect to the choice of e t+1 are then given by
E[U(e t+1)]′ ≡ βτr t+1
[
(1− p)u′(Rut+1)−γpu′(Rdt+1)
]
= 0 (9)
E[U(e t+1)]′′ ≡ β(τr t+1)2
[
(1− p)u′′(Rut+1)+ pγ2u′′(Rdt+1)
]
< 0 (10)
Equation (9) characterizes e∗t+1, the optimal fraction of income concealed. We
will assume in the following that such an interior solution e∗t+1 ∈ [0,1] always
exists.
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The fraction of evasion decreases as tax enforcement becomes stricter, i.e.
de∗t+1/dp< 0 and de∗t+1dγ< 0. This can be seen by implicitly differentiating
the first order condition (9). Furthermore, a marginal increase in the tax
rate reduces the optimal share of evasion:
de∗t+1
dτ
= (1− p)τβr
2
t+1u
′(Rut+1)[ρ(R
u
t+1)(1− e t+1)−ρ(Rdt+1)(1+γe t+1)]
−E[U(e t+1)]′′
< 0
(11)
where ρ(x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x) is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aver-
sion, which satisfies ρ′(x)≤ 0 and thereby ρ(Rdt+1)≥ ρ(Rut+1) for non-increasing
absolute risk aversion12. Intuitively, a higher tax rate reduces taxpayers’ in-
come and makes them less willing to take risks. There is no substitution
effect as the penalty is assumed to be levied on the share of income evaded,
implying that marginal gains and marginal costs from evasion exactly off-
set each other. In addition to the standard model which considers evasion
in levels, however, the above result predicts a decreasing share of evasion
instead of a decreasing level.
Similarly, for ρ(Rdt+1) ≥ ρ(Rut+1), an increase in the interest rate (capital
income) lowers the optimal share of evasion:
de∗t+1
dr t+1
= (1− p)τβr t+1u
′(Rut+1)[ρ(R
d
t+1)(1−τ−τγe t+1)−ρ(Rut+1)(1−τ+τe t+1)]
−E[U(e t+1)]′′
≤ 0
(12)
Thus, our model predicts that the percentage of evasion over total income
decreases. The intuition is similar to the one coming from an increase in the
tax rate. First, there is no substitution effect as the penalty is assumed to
be levied on the share of income evaded, implying that marginal gains and
marginal costs from evasion exactly offset each other. Second, a higher inte-
rest rate increases taxpayers’ income and makes them more willing to evade
income13. However, given that concealed income has an income elasticity of
demand less than one, the percentage of evaded taxes decreases.
2.3 Dynamics and Steady State
We are now able to define the intertemporal equilibrium of the economy.
Given a fiscal policy (parameters τ, p and γ) and an initial value of the capi-
tal stock k0 =K0/N−1 = s−1, a perfect-foresight intertemporal equilibrium is
12Note that this assumption is always satisfied for our logarithmic preference representa-
tion.
13It is straight forward to show that the amount of concealed income, e t+1r t+1, increases
in r t+1.
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characterized by a sequence of quantities and prices:
{ct, dt, kt, st, e t; wt, r t}t≥0.
Individuals maximize utility, firms maximize profits, factor markets are com-
petitive, and all markets clear. The market-clearing conditions for the labour
and capital markets are
L t =Nt, (13)
K t =Nt−1st−1. (14)
The dynamics of the basic model are characterized by the following first or-
der difference equation (using (2), (3) and (13)):
kt+1 = β1+β (1−α)Ak
α
t (15)
which monotonically converges towards a unique steady state k∗. Clearly,
the tax rate does not affect the dynamics so that the share of evasion in-
creases throughout the transition towards the steady state, i.e. de t+1/dkt >
0.
Therefore, the basic model turns out to be inconsistent with a wide range
of empirical findings: First, it predicts a decrease of the share of evasion as
a response to a tax increase whereas empirical studies point to an increase
of evasion at the individual level (see e.g. Clotfelter (1983) and Joulfaian
and Rider (1996)) as well as at the aggregate level (Poterba, 1987). Second,
in this model agents will always evade taxes as long as this is the profitable
option while empirical evidence shows that there are individuals that never
evade (see for example, Baldry (1986) and Alm (1999)). Third, recent empir-
ical literature shows that taxpayers’ attitudes towards evasion are related
to the behavior of other taxpayers in the society (see e.g. Gaechter (2006)).
Still, in the basic framework taxpayers behavior is absolutely independent
of others. Moreover, cross sectional data and longitudinal data suggest that
the share of evasion over GDP decreases with the stage of economic develop-
ment (see for instance, Gordon and Li (2005), Easterly and Rebelo (1993a)
and Easterly and Rebelo (1993b) for the cross-sectional case and, Crane and
Nourzad (1986) and Schneider et al. (2011) for the longitudinal one). By con-
trast, the results of the basic model imply an increase of the share of evasion
along the transitional path of an economy.
In order to reconcile theory with empirical evidence, the next section in-
troduces moral concerns into the basic model.
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3 Morality
In this section we introduce morality and reputation concerns along the lines
of Gordon (1989). Accordingly, tax morale is modeled as an internalized so-
cial norm for tax compliance. The strength of this norm is assumed to be
endogenous and depends on the number of individuals in society adhering to
it (Akerlof, 1980, Lindbeck et al., 1999). Hence, if tax evasion becomes more
common, the social norm is less powerful as it becomes easier for taxpayers
to justify their wrongdoing to themselves, the more other people violate the
societies’ code of conduct. Preferences therefore do not only depend on con-
sumption levels but also on the ‘moral costs’ of tax evasion. Consequently,
the life-cycle utility function of an individual i born in period t is
Ui(ct,dut+1,d
d
t+1, e t+1)=E[U(ct,dut+1,ddt+1)]− e t+1(θi+µ(1−nt)) (16)
where the expression (θi+µ(1−nt))e t+1 captures the moral costs of tax eva-
sion. These costs are linearly increasing in the individual degree of norm in-
ternalization θi ≥ 0, which has distribution function F(θi) and support [0, θ¯].
Furthermore, moral costs depend on individually fixed (marginal) reputa-
tion costs µ> 0 and on the share of evaders in society nt. Individuals maxi-
mize (16) subject to (8), (5) and (6) taking prices and the number of evaders
nt as given. The first-order condition for an interior solution is
E[U(.)]′ ≡βτr t+1
[
(1− p)u′(Rut+1)−γpu′(Rdt+1)
]
= θi+µ(1−nt) (17)
while the second order condition is the same as (10). Norm guided taxpayers
will choose a share of evasion such that the marginal expected utility E[U(.)]′
equals θi +µ(1− nt), the marginal moral costs from concealing income. An
interior solution requires the evasion gamble to be better than fair14, i.e.
z(r t+1)≡E[U(0)]′ = (1− p(1+γ))βτr t+11−δ+ (1−τ)r t+1
> 0 (18)
>From equations (17) and (10) it follows that taxpayers with θi+µ(1−nt)>
z(r t+1) do not conceal any income. This implies the threshold
θˆ(nt, r t+1)≡ z(r t+1)−µ(1−nt) (19)
which allows us to characterize the optimal individual evasion behavior e∗,it+1
for a given level of nt and r t+1:
e∗,it+1 =
{
0 for θi ≥ θˆ(nt, r t+1)
ei,∗t+1 for θi < θˆ(nt, r t+1)
(20)
14This requires 1− p(1+γ) > 0 or equivalently γ < (1− p)/p. The opposite case, in which
1− p(1+γ)< 0 is negative, is of little interest, since tax evasion would never take place.
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Those individuals with θi < θˆ(nt, r t+1) will choose an intermediate level of
evasion, ei,∗t+1 ∈ [0, e∗t+1], whereas those with θi ≥ θˆ(nt, r t+1) do not evade as
compliance to the norm is the best policy.
Similar to the basic model without morality, evasion decreases when p or
γ increase for those individuals with θi < θˆ. Moreover, θˆ falls in both cases, so
that the number of individuals choosing e∗t+1 = 0 increases. Hence, aggregate
evasion must fall. The effects of a change in τ and r t+1 are described by the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that γ < 2(1− p)/(1+2p). Then, there exists some
θ˜(nt, r t+1)< θˆ(nt, r t+1) such that ∂ei,∗t+1/∂τ≤ 0, ∂ei,∗t+1/∂r t+1 ≤ 0 if θi < θ˜(nt, r t+1)
and ∂ei,∗t+1/∂τ> 0, ∂ei,∗t+1/∂r t+1 > 0 if θi > θ˜(nt, r t+1) for all kt and nt.
Proof: See Appendix.
The effect of a change in the tax rate on tax evasion has been demonstrated
before by Gordon (1989) and Traxler (2010) in a static framework. It is
shown here how such a result carries over to a dynamic framework and that
it holds along the complete transitional path of the economy. The basic intu-
ition is the following: a higher tax rate increases the marginal benefits, as
well as the marginal costs (associated with higher expected fines and with
morality concerns). In the model of the previous section (without morality)
we show that this marginal gains and marginal costs from evasion exactly
offset each other, implying no substitution effect and only a negative income
effect which encourages taxpayers to take less risks and so, to reduce tax
evasion. However, in this version of the model, given that moral costs of eva-
sion are assumed to depend on the share of income concealed rather than on
taxes evaded, costs are not affected by a tax change. As a result, marginal
benefits from concealing exceed marginal expected costs implying a substitu-
tion effect that provides an incentive to increase evasion. We prove that for
those with θi < θ˜, the negative income effect dominates and so, tax evasion
reduces as taxes rises. Whereas for those with θi > θ˜ the substitution effect
prevails and, tax evasion increases.
An increase in the interest rate produces similar effects to those of the
tax rate. It increases the marginal benefits as well as the marginal costs of
evasion. However, as moral costs of evasion are assumed to depend on the
share of income concealed, the increase in marginal benefits from concealing
is above the increase in marginal expected costs, producing a substitution
effect which incentives to increase tax evasion. Moreover, similar to the
model without morality, there is a positive income effect which increases the
total amount of evaded taxes. However, given that tax evasion has an income
elasticity of demand less than one, the percentage of evaded taxed decreases.
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Thus, the resulting effect depends on a positive income effect as in the basic
model and a substitution effect working into the opposite direction. It will
be negative for those individuals with θi < θ˜ and positive otherwise.
As to the behavior of those with θi > θ˜, differentiation of (19) yields
∂θˆ(nt, r t+1)
∂τ
> 0 and ∂θˆ(nt, r t+1)
∂r t+1
> 0. (21)
Therefore, the tendency for the share of aggregate evasion to increase is rein-
forced by the emergence of new evaders (in particular a least honest subset
of the initial non-evaders). It is only large evaders who exhibit the stan-
dard portfolio response and reduce their holdings of the risky asset. Their
more honest peers evade more, the higher tax rate making evasion less of
an amoral gamble.
3.1 Dynamics and Steady State
The definition of an intertemporal equilibrium is analogous to the basic
model without morality. Nevertheless, apart from a fiscal policy (parame-
ters τ, p and γ) and an initial value of the capital stock k0 > 0, an additional
initial value of the share of evaders in society is required, n0 ≥ 0. Thus, a
perfect-foresight intertemporal equilibrium is characterized by a sequence
of quantities and prices:
{ct, dt, kt, st, e t, nt; wt, r t}t≥0.
such that individuals maximize utility, firms maximize profits, factor mar-
kets are competitive, and all markets clear.
The capital stock in period t+1 results from individuals’ savings in the
preceding period, i.e. kt+1 = st which implies (using (8)):
kt+1 = β1+β (1−α)Ak
α
t (22)
The equilibrium share of evaders evolves according to the following dynamic
equation:
nt+1 = F
(
θˆ(nt, r t+1)
)
(23)
Clearly, the share of evaders in period t+1 is a positive function of the tax
rate and the share of evaders in the preceding period whereas it is decrea-
sing in the interest rate. Just note that F ′ > 0 and recall equations (19) and
(21).
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The aggregate (average) share of evasion in period t+1 is given by
e¯ t+1 =
∫ θ¯
0
ei,∗t+1 f (θi)dθi =
∫ θˆ(nt,r t+1)
0
ei,∗t+1 f (θi)dθi. (24)
The derivatives of e¯ t+1 with respect to kt and τ can be written as follows15:
∂e¯ t+1
∂kt
=
∫ θˆ(nt,r t+1)
0
∂ei,∗t+1
∂r t+1
f (θi)dθi+ ei,∗
t+1
∣∣
θi=θˆ(nt ,rt+1)
∂θˆ(nt, r t+1)
∂r t+1
 ∂r t+1
∂kt
(25)
and
∂e¯ t+1
∂τ
=
∫ θˆ(nt,r t+1)
0
∂ei,∗t+1
∂τ
f (θi)dθi+ ei,∗
t+1
∣∣
θi=θˆ(nt ,rt+1)
∂θˆ(nt, r t+1)
∂τ
(26)
The second summand in both equations describes the change of aggregate
evasion due to the emergence of new evaders in the society. Since ∂θˆ/∂τ> 0
and ∂θˆ/∂r t+1 > 0, an increase of the share of evaders should increase the
share of tax evasion. However, at the margin, this effect is equal to zero
and the second summand vanishes as ei,∗t+1 evaluated at θi = θˆ is equal to
zero according to its definition. The first summand describes the response of
existing evaders and can be decomposed into a negative effect for those indi-
viduals with θi < θ˜(nt, r t+1) and a positive effect for those with θi > θ˜(nt, r t+1),
as has been demonstrated in proposition 1. The overall effect thus critically
depends on the distribution function F(θi).
As has been demonstrated in Gordon (1989), a sufficient condition for an
interior steady state n∗ ∈ (0,1) is given by
max
{
θ¯,µ
}
> θˆ(k∗,1)> min
{
θ¯,µ
}
(27)
where k∗ = (β/(1+β)(1−α)A)1/(1−α) is the steady state solution of equation
(22). Moreover, in the appendix it is shown that a sufficient condition for a
stable steady state (n∗,k∗) of the dynamic system defined by equations (22)
and (23) is
1
F ′(θˆ(n∗, r∗))
>βα(1−α)Akα∗
(
µ
1+β +
τ(1−δ)(1− p(1+γ))
k∗(1−δ+ (1−τ)r∗)2
)
(28)
The existence of multiple steady states clearly depends on the functional
form of F.16 For an uniform distribution, however, there is a unique steady
15For the derivation of these formulaes, see Leibniz’s rule for differentiation of parametric
integrals.
16See Kim (2003) or Traxler (2010) for an analysis of multiple steady states.
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state (n∗,k∗) and the stability condition boils down to assuming that θ¯ is suf-
ficiently large. As a consequence, in this case it is also possible to explicitly
determine the signs of equations (25) and (26). More precisely, we get
sign
(
∂e¯ t+1
∂kt
)
=− sign
(
∂e¯ t+1
∂τ
)
= (29)
=µ(1−nt)(γ−1)Rt+1−βτγr t+1+ m¯ (30)
where Rt+1 = 1−δ+ (1−τ)r t+1 and
m¯=
√
(βτγr t+1−µ(1−nt)(γ+1)Rt+1)2+4pβτγr t+1µ(1−nt)(γ+1)Rt+1. (31)
Straight forward calculations show that
− sign
(
∂e¯ t+1
∂kt
)
= sign
(
∂e¯ t+1
∂τ
)
> 0 ⇔ θˆ(nt, r t+1)> 0. (32)
These findings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume that F is uniformly distributed with support [0, θ¯].
Then, a higher tax rate increases the aggregate share of evasion, i.e. ∂e¯ t+1/∂τ>
0 whereas it is decreasing with the level of per capita income, i.e. ∂e¯ t+1/∂kt <
0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The above results are consistent with the empirical findings of Crane and
Nourzad (1986) who document the evolution of aggregate evasion in the US
over the period 1947-81. Furthermore, interpreting each point along the dy-
namic path of the economy as a specific set of countries, our model accounts
for the observation that tax evasion is a more severe problem in developing
countries as compared to developed ones (see e.g. Gordon and Li (2005)). In
particular, our simple model predicts that the share of evasion decreases as
economies converge towards the (unique) steady state. Moreover, as a conse-
quence, the average moral cost of tax evasion decreases with per capita in-
come, which is consistent with empirical results (see Torgler and Schneider
(2007) and Bethencourt (2013)). Finally, the extended version of the model
allows to account for existent puzzles in the literature of tax evasion which
the basic model without morality could not explain. In fact, predictions of
the model are consistent with the following empirical findings: a positive
relationship between tax evasion and tax rates at the micro and macro level;
the fact that there exists taxpayers that never evade as long as this is the
profitable option and the observation that the higher is the share of evaders
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in the society, the lower is the morale cost of evading and so, the laxer are
taxpayers’ attitudes towards evasion.
Summarizing, the model is able to account simultaneously for well known
micro empirical findings as well as for the latest macro-dynamic observa-
tions which have been recently documented in the empirical literature on
tax evasion.
3.2 A Numerical Example
In order to illustrate how the aggregate share of evasion and the share of
evaders in the economy react to an increase in the tax rate and how these
variables evolve along the transition towards the steady state, we perform
a simple numerical simulation exercise.17 More specifically, we use the fol-
lowing parameter configuration: α= 0.3, a standard value in the literature,
p= 0.05, γ= 2 which implies 1− p(1+γ)= 0.85 and therefore corresponds to
the average value implied by the fiscal systems of most countries (see Kim
(2003)), A = 8 and δ= 0.9 as in Rivas (2003). Finally, we set β= 0.7, µ= 0.1
and θ¯ = 1. Table 1 summarizes the share of evaders and the share of evaded
income in steady state for varying levels of τ. Clearly, an increase in the
capital income tax rate by five percentage points raises the share of evaders
in society as well as the share of taxes evaded. For example, increasing τ
from 0.3 to 0.35 raises the share of evaders by five percentage points from
13.8% to 19.9% while the aggregate share of evaded income increases by 2.2
percentage points from 7.7% to 9.9%.
τ 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
n∗ 0.0364 0.0842 0.1380 0.1990 0.2688
e¯∗ 0.0170 0.0497 0.0776 0.0994 0.1165
Table 1: Predicted steady state shares of evaded income and of evaders in
society for varying levels of the capital income tax.
Figure 2 presents the dynamics of e¯ t+1 and nt+1 for alternative levels
17It is worth noting that a calibration exercise for specific countries is beyond the scope
of the present paper, whose aim is mainly concerned with the theoretical analysis of the
dynamical features of an OLG economy with capital income tax evasion. In this respect,
this model may be considered a useful starting point where more realistic components can
be added for calibrations analysis and policy exercises in both developing and developed
countries.
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Figure 1: Dynamics of the share of evaded income (left) and the share of
evaders in society (right) for different levels of τ and initial values k0 = 1
and n0 = 0.3. Stars indicate steady state levels.
of τ.18 More precisely, τ = 0.2 corresponds to the lowest transitional paths
whereas the highest ones correspond to τ = 0.4. Both the share of evaded
income as well as the share of evaders in society monotonically decrease as
capital accumulates in line with our theoretical predictions.
Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of average marginal costs of
evasion per percentage points of evaded income, i.e.
∫ θ¯
0 (θi+µ(1−nt)) f (θi)dθi.
These costs increase throughout the transition towards the steady state as
the share of evaders decreases. Furthermore, the level of these costs in-
creases with the tax rate. As a result, tax morale increases with the stage of
economic development when economies accumulate capital.
Figure 2: Average morale costs per percentage points of evaded income for
different levels of τ and initial values k0 = 1 and n0 = 0.3. Stars indicate
steady state levels.
18More specifically, τ is increased in steps of 5% percentage points from τ= 0.2 to τ= 0.4.
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4 Conclusions
This paper integrates non-pecuniary costs of evasion into a dynamic overlap-
ping generations model of capital income tax evasion to explain the empir-
ical observation that evasion is a more severe phenomenon among develop-
ing countries as compared to developed countries. It is shown that morale
concerns may not only explain why some taxpayers never evade even if the
gamble is better than fair, and how a higher tax rate can increase evasion
(as has been demonstrated before in static models of tax evasion) but also
that the share of evaded taxes over GDP may decrease with the stage of eco-
nomic development as per capita income increases. By contrast, tax morale
increases with per capita income as the number of evaders in society declines.
While the overall effect on aggregate evasion in general critically depends on
the relative share of two subgroups, namely those individuals who display
conventional comparative static behavior and their more honest peers who
care about non-pecuniary costs, results for a uniform distribution suggest
that the overall effect is indeed negative. Moreover, an increase in the tax
rate increases aggregate evasion as well as the number of evaders in the eco-
nomy when taxpayers decisions are interdependent whereas the number of
evaders declines when per capita income increases as a lower interest rate
reduces the size of the gamble.
Our findings complement the existing literature on evasion by demon-
strating how the size of tax evasion evolves along the transitional path
of an economy, whereas previous studies either consider a static environ-
ment without production (see e.g. Gordon (1989) or Kim (2003)) or focus on
the relationship between tax evasion and economic growth on a balanced
growth path (see e.g. Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) or Levaggi and
Menoncin (2012)). Furthermore, the present paper documents a positive
relationship between per capita income and tax morale consistent with re-
cent empirical evidence (see Torgler and Schneider (2007) and Bethencourt
(2013)).
Throughout this paper we have assumed that tax revenue is wasted (or
equivalently spent on some public consumption good). Consequently, there
is no feedback effect from the aggregate level of evasion on capital accumula-
tion through the government’s budget constraint. The simplest though not
convincing way, however, to incorporate such a feedback effect would be to
assume that revenue is redistributed lump sum to the young households. In
this case, an increase in the share of evaders in the economy exerts a direct
negative effect on per capita income as individuals save less due to a smaller
17
transfer.19
We have also abstracted from wage income taxation. The reason is that
individuals savings and evasion decisions became dependent as the amount
of taxes evaded in the first period of life affects the potential to save for old
age consumption. Numerical simulation results at the individual level for
such a case, however, suggests that the main result of proposition 1 carries
over to a more elaborated model. We leave a more thorough analysis of these
feedback effects for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1:
For reasons of notational simplicity, set θ¯i = θi +µ(1− nt). First, consider
the effect of a tax increase. Implicitly differentiating equation (17) with re-
spect to τ gives
dei,∗t+1
dτ
= 1
−E[U(ei,∗t+1)]′′
((1− p)τr t+1u′(Rut+1)r t+1[ρ(Rut+1)(1− ei,∗t+1)
−ρ(Rdt+1)(1+γei,∗t+1)]+
θ¯i
βτ
+ θ¯i
β
ρ(Rdt+1)(1+γei,∗t+1)r t+1) (33)
Setting the nominator equal to zero and solving for θi yields
θ˜ =β (1− p)τ
(
r t+1
)2u′(d˜u)[ρ(d˜u)(1−τ+τei,∗t+1)−ρ(d˜d)(1−τ−τγei,∗t+1)]
1− r t+1ρ(d˜d)(1−τ−τγei,∗t+1)
−µ(1−nt)
(34)
19Alternatively, one may also consider financing productive public spending which how-
ever dramatically increases the model’s complexity and precludes analytical solutions.
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Hence, we have
dE[U(ei,∗t+1)]
′
dτ
{
> 0 if θi > θ˜
≤ 0 if θi ≤ θ˜ ⇔
dei,∗t+1
dτ
{
> 0 if θi > θ˜
≤ 0 if θi ≤ θ˜ (35)
Similarly, the effect of an increase in the interest rate can be derived as
follows:
dei,∗t+1
dr t+1
= 1−E[U(e t+1)]′′
{−(1− p)τr t+1u′(Rut+1)[ρ(Rut+1)(1−τ+τei,∗t+1)
−ρ(Rdt+1)(1−τ−τγei,∗t+1)]+
θ¯i
βr t+1
− θ¯iρ(Rdt+1)(1−τ−τγei,∗t+1)} (36)
Solving the above equation for θi yields the same threshold θ˜ as in equation
(34) so that
dE[U(ei,∗t+1)]
′
dr t+1
{
> 0 if θi > θ˜
≤ 0 if θi ≤ θ˜ ⇔
dei,∗t+1
dr t+1
{
> 0 if θi > θ˜
≤ 0 if θi ≤ θ˜ (37)
We now have to prove that there exists non-emptiness, this is, that there
exists a set of individuals such that, θi ∈
(
θ˜, θˆ
)
and thus, the above results are
supported. Given that the framework we use to model the evasion decision
is non static and the definitions of θ˜, θˆ are sensitive to the state variables of
the economy, it is needed to prove that θ˜ < θ̂ in each period t. The strategy we
follow is to prove that θ˜ < θ̂ ∀ kt, or alternatively ∀ r t+1. First, for r t+1 →∞
(kt → 0) one might get a sufficient condition for θ˜ < θ̂ as follows: Note that
∂θ˜/∂e t+1 > 0. Therefore, set e t+1 = 1 and compare the resulting expressions
θ̂ = βτ(1− p(1+γ))
1−τ −µ(1−nt)>
β(1− p)τ2(1+γ)
(1)2
−µ(1−nt)= θ˜(e t+1 = 1)
⇔ βτ(1− p(1+γ))
1−τ >
β(1− p)τ2(1+γ)
(1)2
The inequality is true if γ< 3(1−p)3p+1 holds. So if kt and γ are sufficiently small
we have θ˜ < θ̂.
Second, from equations (19) and (34) we get
∂θ̂
∂r t+1
= βτ
(
1− p(1+γ))[1−δ][
1−δ+ (1−τ)r t+1
]2 > 0
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∂θ˜
∂r t+1
= β(1− p)τ
2(1+γ)e t+12(1−δ)r t+1
(1−δ+ (1−τ+τe t+1)r t+1)3
> 0
and
∂2θ̂
∂r2t+1
= −2βτ
(
1− p(1+γ))[1−δ] (1−τ)[
1−δ+ (1−τ)r t+1
]3 < 0
∂2θ˜
∂r2t+1
= β(1− p)τ
2(1+γ)e t+12(1−δ)
[
1−δ−2(1−τ+τe t+1)r t+1
]
(1−δ+ (1−τ+τe t+1)r t+1)4
with
∂2θ˜
∂r2t+1
=

> 0 if r t+1 <ϕ
(
e t+1
)
= 0 if r t+1 =ϕ
(
e t+1
)
< 0 if r t+1 >ϕ
(
e t+1
) where ϕ(e t+1)= 1−δ2(1−τ+τe t+1) > 0 ∀e t+1
Notice that θ˜ < θ̂ ∀ r t+1 if the following expression is satisfied
∂θ˜
∂r t+1
(
r t+1 =ϕ
(
e t+1
))< ∂θ̂
∂r t+1
(
r t+1 =ϕ
(
e t+1
))
this is,
β(1− p)τ2(1+γ)e t+12(1−δ)r t+1(
3
2
)3
(1−δ)3
< βτ
(
1− p(1+γ))[1−δ][
1−δ+ (1−τ)r t+1
]2
⇔ τe t+1
(1−τ+τe t+1)
<
(
1− p(1+γ))(
(1+γ)− p(1+γ))
(
(
3
2
)(
1−δ))2[
1−δ+ (1−τ)r t+1
]2 32 (38)
Given that the left side of the equation (38) is increasing in both τ and e t+1,
if we guarantee that equation (38) holds for τ= e t+1 = 1, then it is also true
∀τ, e t+1. So, evaluating equation (38) at τ= e t+1 = 1, we obtain(
1− p(1+γ))(
(1+γ)− p(1+γ)) >
(
2
3
)3
which is equivalent to γ< 2(1−p)(1+2p) . The proof of proposition 1 follows by noting
that 3(1−p)(1+3p) >
2(1−p)
(1+2p) .
Proof of equation (28):
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A steady state (k∗,n∗) of the dynamic system
kt+1 =Φ(kt) (39)
nt+1 =Ψ(nt,kt+1) (40)
is locally stable if the following conditions are met (see de la Croix and
Michel (2002))
|1+D| > |T| and |D| < 1 (41)
where T =Ψkt(n∗,k∗)= F ′(n∗,k∗) ∂θˆ∂r+1
∂r t+1
∂kt
is the trace of the Jacobian matrix
G derived from a first order Taylor expansion of the dynamic system around
a steady state, i.e.
G =
(
0 Φkt(k∗)
Ψnt(n∗,k∗) Ψkt(n∗,k∗)
)
(42)
and D = −α β1+β (1−α)Akα−1t F ′(n∗,k∗)µ. The condition |D| < 1 is equivalent
to
1
F ′(n∗,k∗)
> β
1+βα(1−α)Ak
α−1
t µ. (43)
Similarly, the condition |1+D| > |T| is equivalent to (note that 1+D > 0 since
|D| < 1)
1
F ′(n∗,k∗)
>βα(1−α)Akα−1t
(
µ
1+β +
τ(1−δ)(1− p(1+γ))
k∗(1−δ+ (1−τ)r∗)2
)
. (44)
This proves equation (28).
Proof of proposition 2:
In order to prove proposition 2 we need to derive the derivatives of e¯ t+1
with respect to r t+1 and τ. The derivation of these expressions relies on the
explicit solution of equation (17). More precisely, solving for ei,∗t+1 gives
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ei,∗t+1 =
βr t+1γτ−Rt+1(γ−1)(θi+µ(1−nt))− m˜
2r t+1γτ(θi+µ(1−nt))
(45)
where Rt+1 = 1−δ+ (1−τ)r t+1 and
m˜=
√
(βτγr t+1− (θi+µ(1−nt))(γ+1)Rt+1)2+4pβτγr t+1(θi+µ(1−nt))(γ+1)Rt+1.
(46)
20Note that there are two solutions. However, one of them can be excluded from the
analysis due to economic reasoning as such a solution is positive for all values of θi.
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Derivation of the above expression gives:
∂ei,∗t+1
∂r t+1
= (1−δ)(γ−1)m˜+ (γ+1)(Rt+1(γ+1)(θi+µ(1−nt))−βr t+1γτ(1−2p)))
2r2t+1γτm˜
(47)
and
∂ei,∗t+1
∂τ
= (1−δ+ r t+1)(γ−1)m˜− (γ+1)(Rt+1(γ+1)(θi+µ(1−nt))+βr t+1γτ(1−2p)))
2r t+1γτ2m˜
(48)
Integrating these expressions over the relevant range ([0, θˆ]) and assuming
an uniform distribution yields:
∂e¯ t+1
∂r t+1
= (1−δ){βr t+1γτ−Rt+1(γ−1)µ(1−nt)− m˜}
2Rt+1r2t+1γτ
(49)
and
∂e¯ t+1
∂τ
= (1−δ+ r t+1){βr t+1γτ−Rt+1(γ−1)µ(1−nt)− m˜}
2Rt+1r t+1γτ2
(50)
The sign of these derivatives is determined by the sign of the expression in
curly brackets. The proof of proposition 2 follow immediately by noting that
dr t+1/dkt < 0 and by recalling equation (32).
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